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Abstract—Methods for proving that concurrent software does
not leak its secrets has remained an active topic of research
for at least the past four decades. Despite an impressive array
of work, the present situation remains highly unsatisfactory.
With contemporary compositional proof methods one is forced
to choose between expressiveness (the ability to reason about a
wide variety of security policies), on the one hand, and precision
(the ability to reason about complex thread interactions and
program behaviours), on the other. Achieving both is essential
and, we argue, requires a new style of compositional reasoning.
We present VERONICA, the first program logic for proving
concurrent programs information flow secure that supports
compositional, high-precision reasoning about a wide range of
security policies and program behaviours (e.g. expressive de-
classification, value-dependent classification, secret-dependent
branching). Just as importantly, VERONICA embodies a new
approach for engineering such logics that can be re-used
elsewhere, called decoupled functional correctness (DFC). DFC
leads to a simple and clean logic, even while achieving this
unprecedented combination of features. We demonstrate the
virtues and versatility of VERONICA by verifying a range of
example programs, beyond the reach of prior methods.
1. Introduction
Software guards our most precious secrets. More often
than not, software systems are built as a collection of
concurrently executing threads of execution that cooperate
to process data. In doing so, these threads collectively
implement security policies in which the sensitivity of the
data being processed is often data-dependent [1]–[10], and
the rules about to whom it can be disclosed and under what
conditions can be non-trivial [11]–[16]. The presence of
concurrency greatly complicates reasoning, since a thread
that behaves securely when run in isolation can be woefully
insecure in the presence of interference from others [10],
[17]–[19] or due to scheduling [20], [21].
For these reasons, being able to formally prove that
concurrent software does not leak its secrets (to the wrong
places at the wrong times) has been an active and open
topic of research for at least the past four decades [22],
[23]. Despite an impressive array of work over that time,
the present situation remains highly unsatisfactory. With
contemporary proof methods one is forced to choose be-
tween expressiveness (e.g. [24]–[27]), on the one hand, and
precision (e.g. [10], [19], [28]–[33]), on the other.
By expressiveness, we mean the ability to reason about
the enforcement of a wide variety of security policies and
classes thereof, such as state-dependent secure declassi-
fication and data-dependent sensitivity. It is well estab-
lished that, beyond simple noninterference [34] (“secret data
should never be revealed in public outputs”), there is no uni-
versal solution to specifying information flow policies [13],
and that different applications might have different interpre-
tations on what adherence to a particular policy means.
By precision, we mean the ability to reason about
complex thread interactions and program behaviours. This
includes not just program behaviours like secret-dependent
branching that are beyond the scope of many existing proof
methods (e.g. [10], [19], [28]). Moreover, precision is aided
by reasoning about each thread under local assumptions
that it makes about the behaviour of the others [30], [35].
For instance [10], suppose thread B receives data from
thread A, by acquiring a lock on a shared buffer and then
checking the buffer contents. Thread B relies on thread A
having appropriately labelled the buffer to indicate the (data-
dependent) sensitivity of the data it contains and, while
thread B holds the lock, it relies on all other threads to
avoid modifying the buffer (to preserve the correctness of
the sensitivity label). Precise reasoning here should take
account of these kinds of assumptions when reasoning about
thread B and, correspondingly, should prove that they are
adhered to when reasoning about thread A.
Besides expressiveness and precision, another useful
property for a proof method to have is compositionality. We
say that a proof method is compositional [36]–[39] when it
can be used to establish the security of the entire concurrent
program by using it to prove each thread secure separately.
So far it has remained an open problem of how to design
a proof method (e.g. a security type system [40] or program
logic [41]) that is (a) compositional, (b) supports proving
a general enough definition of security to encode a variety
of security policies, and (c) supports precise reasoning. We
argue that achieving all three together requires a new style
of program logic for information flow security.
In this paper, we present VERONICA. VERONICA is,
to our knowledge, the first compositional program logic
for proving concurrent programs information flow secure
that supports high-precision reasoning about a wide range
of security policies and program behaviours (e.g. expres-
sive declassification, value-dependent classification, secret-
dependent branching). Just as importantly, VERONICA em-
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bodies a new approach for engineering such logics that
can be re-used elsewhere. This approach we call decoupled
functional correctness (DFC), which we have found leads to
a simple and clean logic, even while achieving this unprece-
dented combination of features. Precision is supported by
reasoning about a program’s functional properties. However,
the key insight of DFC is that this reasoning can and
should be separated from reasoning about its information
flow security. As we explain, DFC exploits compositional
functional correctness as a common means to unify together
reasoning about various security concerns.
We provide an overview of VERONICA in Section 2.
Section 3 then describes the general security property that it
enforces, and so formally defines the threat model. Section 4
describes the programming language over which VERONICA
has been developed. Section 5 then describes the VERONICA
logic, whose virtues are further demonstrated in Section 6.
Section 7 considers related work before Section 8 concludes.
All results in this paper have been mechanised in the
interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL [42]. Our Isabelle
formalisation is available online [43].
2. An Overview of VERONICA
2.1. Decoupling Functional Correctness
Figure 1a depicts the data-flow architecture for a
very simple, yet illustrative, example system. This exam-
ple is inspired by a real world security-critical shared-
memory concurrent program [10]. This example purpose-
fully avoids some of VERONICA’s features (e.g. secret-
dependent branching and runtime state-dependent declassifi-
cation policies), which we will meet later in Section 6. Ver-
ifying it requires highly precise reasoning, and the security
policy it enforces involves both data-dependent sensitivity
and delimited release style declassification [44], features that
until now have never been reconciled before.
The system comprises four threads, whose code appears
in Figure 1 (simplified a little for presentation). The four
threads make use of a shared buffer buf protected by a
lock `, which also protects the shared flag variable valid .
The top-middle thread (Figure 1c) copies data into the
shared buffer, from one of two input/output (IO) channels: ⊥
(a public channel whose contents is visible to the attacker)
and > (a private channel, not visible to the attacker). The
right-top thread (Figure 1e) reads data from the shared
buffer buf and copies it to an appropriate output buffer
(either ⊥buf for ⊥ data or >buf for > data) for further
processing by the remaining two output threads.
Each of the bottom threads outputs from its respective
output buffer to its respective channel; one for > data
(Figure 1b) and the other for ⊥ data (Figure 1d).
The decision of the top-middle thread (Figure 1c, line 2),
whether to input from the ⊥ channel or the > one, is
dictated by the shared variable inmode. The valid variable
(initially zero) is set to 1 by the top-middle thread once it
has filled the buf variable, and is then tested by the top-right
thread (Figure 1e, line 2) to ensure it doesn’t consume data
from buf before the top-middle thread has written to buf .
The top-right thread’s decision (Figure 1e, line 3) about
which output buffer it should copy the data in buf to is
dictated by the outmode variable. When outmode indicates
that the > buffer >buf should be used, the top-right thread
additionally performs a signature check (via the CK func-
tion, lines 7–8) on the data to decide if it is safe to declassify
and copy additionally to the ⊥buf output buffer. This con-
current program implements a delimited release [44] style
declassification policy, which states that > data that passes
the signature check, plus the results of the signature check
itself for all > data, are safe to declassify. The language
of VERONICA includes the declassifying assignment com-
mand :̂= and the declassifying output command !̂. Besides
delimited release style declassification policies, we we will
see later in the examples of Section 6 that our security
condition also supports stateful declassification policies.
Clearly, if inmode and outmode disagree, the concurrent
execution of the threads might behave insecurely (e.g. the
top-middle thread might place private > data into buf ,
which the top-right thread then copies to ⊥buf and is
subsequently output on the public channel ⊥). Therefore, the
security of this concurrent program rests on the shared data
invariant that inmode and outmode agree (whenever lock `
is acquired and released). This is a functional correctness
property. There are a number of other such functional prop-
erties, somewhat more implicit, on which the system’s se-
curity relies, e.g. that neither thread will modify buf unless
they hold the lock `, and likewise for inmode and outmode,
plus that only one thread can hold the lock ` at a time.
Similarly, the security of the declassification actions
performed by the top-right thread rests on the fact that it
only declassifies after successfully performing the signature
check, in accordance with the delimited release policy.
Thus one cannot reason about the security of this con-
current program in the absence of functional correctness.
However, one of the fundamental insights of VERONICA is
that functional correctness reasoning should be decoupled
from security reasoning. This is in contrast to many recent
logics for concurrent information flow security, notably [28],
the COVERN logic of [10] and its antecedents [19], [30] as
well as [31], [32] plus many prior logics for sequential pro-
grams [2], [5], [8], [9], [45], [46] and hardware designs [47].
VERONICA decouples functional correctness reasoning
from security reasoning by performing the latter over pro-
grams that carry functional correctness annotations {Ai}
on each program statement si. Thus program statements are
of the form {Ai} si. Here, {Ai} should be thought of as
akin to a Hoare logic precondition [48]. It states conditions
that are known to be true whenever statement si is executed
in the concurrent program. We call this resulting approach
decoupled functional correctness (DFC).
The contents of each of the annotations in Figure 1c
and Figure 1e have been omitted in the interests of brevity
(they can be found in our Isabelle formalisation), and simply
replaced by identifiers {Ai}.
For verifying the security of the top-right thread (Fig-
ure 1e), annotations {A11} through {A15} are most im-
portant: {A11} would imply that buf holds an input read
⊥>
buf
⊥buf
>buf
⊥
>
(a) Data flows. Dotted lines denote de-
classification.
1 {A0} > !>buf
(b) Outputting > data.
1 {A1} acquire(`);
2 {A2} if inmode = 0
3 {A3} buf ←⊥
4 else
5 {A4} buf ←>
6 endif;
7 {A5} valid := 1;
8 {A6} release(`)
(c) Reading data into a shared buffer.
1 {A7} ⊥ !⊥buf
(d) Outputting ⊥ data.
1 {A8} acquire(`);
2 {A9} if valid = 1
3 {A10} if outmode = 0
4 {A11} ⊥buf := buf
5 else
6 {A12} >buf := buf ;
7 {A13} d :̂= CK (>buf );
8 {A14} if d = 0
9 {A15} ⊥buf :̂=>buf
10 endif
11 endif
12 endif ;
13 {A16} release(`)
(e) Copying and declassifying data.
Figure 1: Co-operative Use of a Shared Buffer. Green {Ai} are functional correctness annotations (whose contents we omit).
from channel ⊥ (justifying why copying its contents to
the ⊥ variable ⊥buf is secure), and {A12} would imply
likewise for channel >. {A13} would imply that >buf
holds > data and {A14} that d holds the result of the
signature check. Finally, {A15} implies that the signature
check passed, justifying why the declassifying assignment
to ⊥buf is secure.
The other annotations encode functional correctness in-
formation needed to justify the validity of the aforemen-
tioned annotations. For instance, annotation {A2} in Fig-
ure 1c implies that the thread holds the lock `; {A3} that
inmode is zero, while {A4} the opposite. Annotation {A5}
on the other hand tracks information about the contents
of buf , namely if inmode is zero then buf holds the last
input read from channel ⊥, and it holds the last input read
from channel > otherwise1.
Thus the annotations {Ai} afford highly precise reason-
ing about the security of each thread, while decoupling the
functional correctness reasoning.
The idea of using annotations {Ai} we repurpose from
the Owicki-Gries proof technique [49] for concurrent pro-
grams. Indeed, there exist a range of standard techniques
for inferring and proving the soundness of such annotations
(i.e. for carrying out the functional correctness reasoning),
from the past 40 years of research on concurrent program
verification. VERONICA integrates multiple such techniques
in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover, each of which has been
proved sound from first principles, thereby ensuring the
correctness of its foundations. As we explain later, external
program verifiers may also be used to verify functional
correctness, giving up VERONICA’s foundational guarantees
in exchange for ease of verification.
Given a correctly annotated program, VERONICA then
uses the information encoded in the annotations to prove ex-
pressive security policies, as we outline in the next section.
1. {A5} effectively encodes buf ’s (state-dependent) sensitivity, and
takes the place of dependent security types and labels from prior systems.
2.2. Compositional Enforcement
How can we prove that the concurrent program of Fig-
ure 1 doesn’t violate information flow security, i.e. that no >
data is leaked, unless it has been declassified in accordance
with the delimited release policy?
Doing so in general benefits from having a compo-
sitional reasoning method, namely one that reasons over
each of the program’s threads separately to deduce that the
concurrent execution of those threads is secure.
Compositional methods for proving information flow
properties of concurrent programs have been studied for
decades [20], [21]. Initial methods required one to prove
that each thread was secure ignorant of the behaviour of
other threads [20], [21], [24]. Such reasoning is sound but
necessarily imprecise: for instance when reasoning about
the top-middle thread (Figure 1c) we wouldn’t be allowed
to assume that the top-right thread (Figure 1e) adheres to
the locking protocol that protects buf .
Following Mantel et al. [30], more modern compo-
sitional methods have adopted ideas from rely-guarantee
reasoning [35] and concurrent separation logic [50], to allow
more precise reasoning about each thread under assumptions
it makes about the behaviour of others (e.g. correct locking
discipline) [10], [19], [28]. However, the precision of these
methods comes at the price of expressiveness: specifically,
their inability to reason about declassification. By decou-
pling functional correctness reasoning, VERONICA achieves
both precision and expressiveness.
The VERONICA logic—VERONICA’s compositional IFC
proof method—has judgements of the form lvlA ` c, where
lvlA is a security level (e.g. > or ⊥ in the case of Figure 1)
representing level of the attacker and c is a fragment of
program text (i.e. a program statement). This judgement
holds if the program fragment c doesn’t leak information
to level lvlA that lvlA should not be allowed to observe. For
the code of each thread t, one uses the rules of VERONICA’s
logic to prove that lvlA ` c holds, where lvlA ranges over
all possible security levels. By doing so one establishes
that the concurrent program is secure, under the assumption
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Figure 2: Proving a program secure in VERONICA.
that the concurrent program is functionally correct (i.e. each
of its annotations {Ai} hold when the concurrent program
is executed). As mentioned, functional correctness can be
proved using a range of well-established techniques that
integrate into VERONICA.
Unlike recent compositional proof methods (c.f. [10],
[19], [28], [30]), the judgement of VERONICA has no need
to track variable stability information (i.e. which variables
won’t be modified by other threads), nor any need for a
flow-sensitive typing context to track the sensitivity of data
in shared program variables, nor does it track constraints on
the values of program variables. Instead, this information is
provided via the annotations {Ai}.
For example, the annotation {A11} in Figure 1 (Fig-
ure 1e, line 4) states that: (1) when valid is 1, if inmode
is 0 then buf contains the last input read from channel ⊥
and otherwise it contains the last > input; (2) the top-right
thread holds the lock `; (3) inmode and outmode agree; and
(4) outmode is 0 and valid is 1. Condition (1) implicitly
encodes sensitivity information about the data in the shared
variable buf ; (2) encodes stability information; while (3)
and (4) are constraints on shared program variables.
To prove that the assignment on line 4 of Figure 1e is
secure, VERONICA requires one to show that the sensitivity
of the data contained in buf is at most ⊥ (the level of ⊥buf ).
However one gets to assume that the annotation at this
point {A11} holds. In this case, the obligation is discharged
straightforwardly from the annotation. The same is true for
other other parts of this concurrent program. In this way,
VERONICA leans on the functional correctness annotations
to establish security, and utilises compositional functional
correctness to unify reasoning about various security con-
cerns (e.g. declassification, state-dependent sensitivity, etc.).
2.3. Proving a Concurrent Program Secure
Figure 2 depicts the process of proving a concurrent
program secure using VERONICA. The circled numbers
indicate the main steps and their ordering.
Step À: Defining the Security Policy
The first step is to define the security policy that is to be
enforced. This involves two tasks. The first is to choose an
appropriate lattice of security levels [51] and then to assign
security levels to shared variables (e.g. in the example of
Figure 1, ⊥buf and d both have level ⊥, while >buf has
level >). A variable’s security level is given by the (user
supplied) function L, which assigns levels to variables. For
variable v, L(v) defines the maximum sensitivity of the data
that v is allowed to hold at all times.
In VERONICA not all shared variables need be assigned
a security level, meaning that L is allowed to be a partial
function. For instance, in the example of Figure 1, buf has
no level assigned (i.e. L(buf ) is undefined). The security
policy does not restrict the sensitivity of the data that such
unlabelled variables are allowed to hold. This is useful for
shared variables like buf that form the interface between
two threads and whose sensitivity is governed by a data-
dependent contract [10]. In the example, this allows buf
(whenever valid is 1) to hold ⊥ data when inmode and
outmode are both zero, and > data when inmode and
outmode are both nonzero.
The second part of defining the security policy is to
specify when and how declassification is allowed to occur. In
order to maximise expressiveness, VERONICA supports dy-
namic, state-dependent declassification policies. Such poli-
cies are encoded via the (user supplied) predicate D.
For a source security level lvl src and destination security
level lvldst , the program command c is allowed to declassify
the lvl src-sensitivity value v to level lvldst in system state σ
precisely when D(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, c) holds. Note that the
command c is either a declassifying assignment “{Ai}
x :̂= E” (in which case lvldst is the label L(x) assigned
to the labelled variable x) or a declassifying output “{Ai}
lvldst !̂ E”. In either case, lvl src is the security level of the
expression E and v is the result of evaluating E in state σ.
This style of declassification predicate is able to support
various declassification policies, including delimited release
style policies as in the example of Figure 1. We discuss
precisely how delimited release policies are encoded as
declassification predicates D later in Section 3.4. Other
declassification policies are encountered in Section 6.
Step Á: Supply Annotations
Having defined the security policy, the second step to
proving a concurrent program secure using VERONICA is to
supply sufficient functional correctness annotations {Ai} for
each thread. In the example of Figure 1, while their contents
is not shown, these annotations are already present. However
in practice, users of VERONICA will start with un-annotated
programs for which functional correctness annotations {Ai}
are then supplied to decorate statements c of each thread,
encoding what facts are believed to be true about the state
of the concurrent program whenever statement c executes.
Note that, because these annotations will be verified later
(in step Â), there is no need to trust the process that gener-
ates them. The current Isabelle incarnation of VERONICA
includes a proof-of-concept strongest-postcondition style
annotation inference algorithm, whose results can then be
manually tweaked by the user as necessary. Users are also
free to employ external, automatic program analysis tools
to infer functional correctness annotations, or to supply
annotations manually, without fear of compromising the
foundational guarantees of VERONICA.
Step Â: Verifying Functional Correctness
Having obtained the functional correctness annota-
tions {Ai}, the next step is to prove their validity. This
means proving that the concurrent program is functionally
correct, for which there exist numerous compositional tech-
niques [35], [49].
VERONICA incorporates two standard techniques in the
Isabelle/HOL formalisation: the Owicki-Gries method [49]
and Rely-Guarantee reasoning [35]. VERONICA’s Owicki-
Gries implementation is borrowed from the seminal work
of Prensa Nieto [52], [53]. Using it to verify (correct)
functional correctness annotations requires little effort for
experienced Isabelle users, by guiding Isabelle’s proof au-
tomation tactics. Like VERONICA’s Owicki-Gries method,
its Rely-Guarantee implementation is for verifying func-
tional correctness annotations only, and ignores security
(c.f. [19], [30]). It requires the user to supply rely and
guarantee conditions for each thread. Such conditions can
be defined straightforwardly from the locking protocol of
a concurrent program and in principle could be inferred;
however, we leave that inference for future work.
If one wishes to forego the foundational assurance of
Isabelle/HOL, one can also employ external verification
tools to prove annotation validity. By doing so one may elide
non-essential annotations, which are those on statements
other than output statements, declassifications, assignments
to labelled variables, and branches on unlabelled data. Our
formalisation includes a proof-of-concept of this approach,
in which the concurrent C program verifier VCC [54] is
employed on a C translation of the example in Figure 1 to
prove the functional correctness of its essential annotations,
sufficient to guarantee its security.
Step Ã: Verifying Security
With functional correctness proved, the user is then free
to use the functional correctness annotations to composition-
ally prove the security of the concurrent program. To do this,
the user applies the rules of the VERONICA logic to each
of the program’s threads. VERONICA exploits the functional
correctness assertions to provide a simple logic resembling
a flow-insensitive type system. Each statement is verified
independently of its context. The logic is compositional
and allows each thread to be verified in isolation. Rules
for output statements require that the functional correctness
annotations imply that the expression always evaluates to the
same result given states that are not distinguishable to the
attacker. Similarly, the rules for declassification statements
require that the annotations are sufficient to imply that the
declassification predicate holds. We defer a full presentation
of the logic to Section 5.
Step Ä: Whole Program Security Proof
With both functional correctness and security proved of
each thread, the soundness theorem of the VERONICA logic
can then be applied to derive a theorem stating that the
whole concurrent program is secure. This theorem is stated
formally in Section 5.3. However, intuitively it says that the
whole concurrent program is secure if, for each thread t,
t’s functional correctness annotations are all valid (i.e. each
holds whenever the corresponding statement of t is executed
in the concurrent program)—step Â—and t is judged secure
by the rules of the VERONICA logic—step Ã.
3. Security Definition
VERONICA proves an information flow security property
designed to capture a range of different security policies. To
maximise generality, the security property is phrased in a
knowledge-based (or epistemic) style, which as others have
argued [13], [14], [55], [56] is preferable to traditional two-
run formulations. Before introducing the security property
and motivating the threat model that it formally encodes,
we first explain the semantic model of concurrent program
execution in which the property is defined.
Along the way, we highlight the assumptions encoded
in that semantic model and in the formal security property.
Following Murray and van Oorschot [57], we distinguish
adversary expectations, which are assumptions about the
attacker (e.g. their observational powers); from domain hy-
potheses, which are assumptions about the environment (e.g.
the scheduler) in which the concurrent program executes.
3.1. Semantic Model
Concurrent programs comprise a finite collection of n
threads, each of which is identified by a natural number:
0, . . . , n−1. Threads synchronise by acquiring and releasing
locks and communicate by modifying shared memory. Ad-
ditionally, threads may communicate with the environment
outside the concurrent program by inputting and outputting
values from/to IO channels. Without loss of generality, there
is one channel for each security level (drawn from the user-
supplied lattice of security levels).
Global States σ
Formally, the global states σ of the concurrent pro-
gram are tuples (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ). The global state
contains all resources that are shared between threads. We
consider each in turn.
Channels and the Environment envσ
envσ captures the state of the external environment
(i.e. the IO channels). For a security level lvl ,
envσ(lvl) is the (infinite) stream of values yet to
be consumed from the channel lvl in state σ.
Domain Hypothesis In this model of channels, reading
from a channel never blocks and always returns the next
value to be consumed from the infinite stream. This
effectively assumes that all channel inputs are faithfully
buffered and never dropped by the environment. Block-
ing can be simulated by repeatedly polling a channel.
Shared Memory memσ
memσ is simply a total mapping form variable names
(excluding locks) to their corresponding values: memσ(v)
denotes the value of variable v in state σ.
Locks locksσ
locksσ captures the lock state and is a partial function
from lock names to thread ids (natural numbers in the range
0 . . . n− 1): for a lock `, locksσ(`) is defined iff lock ` is
currently held in state σ, in which case its value is the id
of the thread that holds the lock.
Events e and Traces trσ
For the sake of expressiveness, we store in the global
state σ the entire history of events trσ that has been per-
formed by the concurrent program up to this point. Each
such history is called a trace, and is simply a finite list of
events e. Events e comprise: input events in〈lvl , v〉 which
record that value v was input from the channel lvl ; output
events out〈lvl , v, E〉 which record that value v, the result
of evaluating expression E, was output on channel lvl ;
and declassification events d〈lvl , v, E〉 which record that
the value v, the result of evaluating expression E, was
declassified to level lvl . Expression E is included to help
specify the security property (see e.g. Definition 3.2.7).
Ordinary (non-declassifying) output and input com-
mands produce output and input events respectively. De-
classifying assignments and declassifying outputs produce
declassification events. As with much prior work on declas-
sification properties [58], declassification actions produce
distinguished declassification events that make them directly
visible to the security property.
The Schedule sched
The schedule sched is an infinite list (stream) of thread
ids i. Scheduling occurs by removing the first item i from
the stream and then executing the thread i for one step
of execution. (Longer execution slices can of course be
simulated by repeating i in the schedule.) This process is
repeated ad infinitum. If thread i is stuck (e.g. because it
is waiting on a lock or has terminated) then the system
idles (i.e. does nothing) for an execution step, to mitigate
scheduling leaks (e.g. as implemented in seL4 [59]).
Domain Hypothesis VERONICA assumes determinis-
tic, sequentially-consistent, instruction-based schedul-
ing [60] (IBS) of threads against a fixed, public schedule.
Global Configurations and Concurrent Execution · → ·
A global configuration combines the shared global
state σ with the schedule sched and the local state lsi (the
thread id and code) of each of the n threads. Thus a global
configuration is a tuple: (ls0, . . . , lsn−1, σ, sched).
Concurrent execution, and the aforementioned schedul-
ing model, is formally defined by the rules of Figure 7
(relegated to the appendix for brevity). These rules define
a single-step relation · → · on global configurations. Zero-
and multi-step execution is captured in the usual way by the
reflexive, transitive closure of this relation, written · →∗ ·.
3.2. System Security Property and Threat Model
We now define VERONICA’s formal security property,
formalising the threat model and adversary expectations.
Attacker Observations
Adversary Expectation: Our security property consid-
ers a passive attacker observing the execution of the
concurrent program. We assume that the attacker is able
to observe outputs on certain channels and associated
declassification events. Specifically, the attacker is asso-
ciated with a security level lvlA. Outputs on all chan-
nels lvl ≤ lvlA the attacker is assumed to be able to ob-
serve. Likewise all declassifications to levels lvl ≤ lvlA.
Adversary Expectation: The attacker has no other
means to interact with the concurrent program, e.g. by
modifying its code. We additionally assume that the
attacker does not have access to timing information.
The attacker’s observational powers are formalised by
defining a series of indistinguishability relations as follows.
Definition 3.2.1 (Event Visibility). We say that an input
event in〈lvl , v〉 (respectively output event out〈lvl , v, E〉 or
declassification event d〈lvl , v, E〉) is visible to the attacker
at level lvlA iff lvl ≤ lvlA. Letting e be the event, in this
case we write visible lvlA(e).
Trace indistinguishability is then defined straightfor-
wardly, noting that we write tr  P to denote filtering from
trace tr all events that do not satisfy the predicate P .
Definition 3.2.2 (Trace Indistinguishability). We say that
two traces tr and tr ′ are indistinguishable to the attacker
at level lvlA, when tr  visible lvlA = tr ′  visible lvlA .
In this case, we write tr
lvlA≈ tr ′.
Attacker Knowledge of Initial Global State
Besides defining what the attacker is assumed to
observe (via the indistinguishability relation on traces), we
also need to define what knowledge the attacker is assumed
to have about the initial global state σinit of the system.
Adversary Expectation: The attacker is assumed to
know the contents that will be input from channels at
levels lvl ≤ lvlA and the initial values of all labelled
variables v for which L(v) ≤ lvlA.
This assumption is captured via an indistinguishability
relation on global states σ. This relation is defined by
first defining indistinguishability relations on each of σ’s
components.
Definition 3.2.3 (Environment Indistinguishability). We say
that two environments env and env ′ are indistinguishable
to the attacker at level lvlA when all channels visible to the
attacker have identical streams, i.e. iff
∀lvl ≤ lvlA. env(lvl) = env ′(lvl).
In this case we write env
lvlA≈ env ′.
Definition 3.2.4 (Memory Indistinguishability). We say that
two memories mem and mem ′ are indistinguishable to the
attacker at level lvlA when they agree on the values of all
labelled variables v visible to the attacker, i.e. iff
∀v. L(v) ≤ lvlA =⇒ mem(v) = mem ′(v),
where L(v) ≤ lvlA implies L(v) is defined.
In this case, we write mem
lvlA≈ mem ′.
We can now define when two (initial) global states are
indistinguishable to the attacker.
Definition 3.2.5 (Global State Indistinguishability). We say
that two global states σ and σ′ are indistinguishable to the
attacker at level lvlA iff
envσ
lvlA≈ envσ′ ∧ memσ lvlA≈ memσ′ ∧
locksσ = locksσ′ ∧ trσ lvlA≈ trσ′
In this case we write σ
lvlA≈ σ′.
Domain Hypothesis Under this definition, the attacker
knows the entire initial lock state. Thus we assume that
the initial lock state encodes no secret information.
Attacker Knowledge from Observations
Given the attacker’s knowledge about the initial
state σinit and some observation arising from some trace tr
being performed, we assume that the attacker will then
attempt to refine their knowledge about σinit.
Adversary Expectation: The attacker is assumed to
know the schedule sched and the initial local state lsi
(i.e. the code and thread id i) of each thread.
Given that information, of all the possible initial states
from which σinit might have been drawn, perhaps only a
subset can give rise to the observation of tr . We assume
the attacker will perform this kind of knowledge inference,
which we formalise following the epistemic style [55].
To define the attacker’s knowledge, we define the at-
tacker’s uncertainty about the initial state σinit (i.e. the
attacker’s belief about the set of all initial states from
which σinit might have been drawn) given the initial sched-
ule sched and local thread states ls0, . . . , lsn−1, and the
trace tr that the attacker has observed. Writing simply
ls to abbreviate the list ls0, . . . , lsn−1, we denote this
uncertainty lvlA(ls, σinit, sched , tr) and define it as follows.
Definition 3.2.6 (Attacker Uncertainty). A global state σ
belongs to the set uncertainty lvlA(ls, σinit, sched , tr) iff it
and σinit are indistinguishable, given the attacker’s knowl-
edge about the initial state, and if σ can give rise to
a trace trσ′ that is indistinguishable from tr . Formally,
uncertainty lvlA(ls, σinit, sched , tr) is the set of σ where
σ
lvlA≈ σinit ∧
∃ls ′ σ′ sched ′. (ls, σ, sched)→∗ (ls ′, σ′, sched ′) ∧
tr
lvlA≈ trσ′
The Security Property
Finally, we can define the security property. This
requires roughly that the attacker’s uncertainty can
decrease (i.e. they can refine their knowledge) only when
declassification events occur, and that all such events must
respect the declassification policy encoded by D. In other
words, the guarantee provided by VERONICA under the
threat model formalised herein is that:
Security Guarantee: The attacker is never able to learn
any new information above what they knew initially, ex-
cept from declassification events but those must always
respect the user-supplied declassification policy.
This guarantee is formalised by defining a gradual re-
lease-style security property [55]. We first define when the
occurrence of an event e is secure.
Definition 3.2.7 (Event Occurrence Security). Con-
sider an execution beginning in some initial configura-
tion (ls, σ, sched) that has executed to the intermediate
configuration (ls ′, σ′, sched ′) from which the event e occurs.
This occurrence is secure against the attacker at level lvlA,
written eseclvlA((ls, σ, sched), (ls
′, σ′, sched ′), e), iff
• When e is a declassification event d〈lvldst , v, E〉
visible to the attacker (i.e. lvldst ≤ lvlA), then
D(L(E), lvldst , σ′, v, c) must hold, where c is the current
program command whose execution produced e (i.e. the
head program command of the currently executing thread
in (ls ′, σ′, sched ′)). Here, L(E) is defined when L(v)
is defined for all variables v mentioned in E and in
that case is the least upper bound of all such L(v), and
D(L(E), lvldst , σ′, v, c) is false when L(E) is not defined.
• Otherwise, if e is not a declassification
event d〈lvldst , v, E〉 that is visible to the attacker,
then the attacker’s uncertainty cannot decrease by
observing it, i.e. we require that
uncertainty lvlA(ls, σ, sched , trσ′) ⊆
uncertainty lvlA(ls, σ, sched , trσ′ · e)
Definition 3.2.8 (System Security). The concurrent program
with initial local thread states ls = (ls0, . . . , lsn−1) is se-
cure against an attacker at level lvlA, written sysseclvlA(ls),
iff, under all schedules sched , event occurrence security
always holds during its execution from any initial starting
state σ. Formally, we require that
∀sched σ ls ′ σ′ sched ′ ls ′′ σ′′sched ′′ e.
(ls, σ, sched)→∗ (ls ′, σ′, sched ′) ∧
(ls ′, σ′, sched ′)→ (ls ′′, σ′′, sched ′′) ∧
trσ′′ = trσ′ · e =⇒
eseclvlA((ls, σ, sched), (ls
′, σ′, sched ′), e)
3.3. Discussion
As with other gradual release-style properties, ours does
not directly constrain what information the attacker might
learn when a declassification event occurs, but merely that
those are the only events that can increase the attacker’s
knowledge. This means that, of the four semantic principles
of declassification identified by Sabelfeld and Sands [61],
our definition satisfies all but non-occlusion: “the presence
of declassifications cannot mask other covert information
leaks” [61]. Consider the following single-threaded program.
1 {A17} if birthYear > 2000
2 {A18} ⊥ !̂ birthDay
3 else
4 {A19} ⊥ !̂ birthMonth
Suppose the intent is to permit the unconditional release of
a person’s day and month of birth, but not their birth year. A
naive encoding in the declassification policy D that checks
whether the value being declassified is indeed either the
value of birthDay or birthMonth would judge the above
program as secure, when in fact it also leaks information
about the birthYear .
Note also, since declassification events are directly vis-
ible to our security property, that programs that incorrectly
declassify information but then never output it on a public
channel can be judged by our security condition as insecure.
Finally, and crucially, note that our security condition
allows for both extensional declassification policies, i.e.
those that refer only to inputs and outputs of the program,
as well as intensional policies that also refer to the program
state. Section 6 demonstrates both kinds of policies. We now
consider one class of extensional policies: delimited release.
3.4. Encoding Delimited Release Policies
The occlusion example demonstrates that programs that
branch on secrets that are not allowed to be released and
then perform declassifications under that secret context are
likely to leak more information than that contained in the
declassification events themselves, via implicit flows.
However, in the absence of such branching, our security
condition can in fact place bounds on what information is
released. Specifically, we show that it can soundly encode
delimited release [44] policies as declassification predi-
cates D for programs that do not branch on secrets that
are not allowed to be declassified to the attacker.
We define an extensional delimited release-style security
condition and show how to instantiate the declassification
predicates D so that when system security (Definition 3.2.8)
holds, then so does the delimited release condition.
3.4.1. Formalising Delimited Release
Delimited release [44] weakens traditional noninterfer-
ence [34] by permitting certain secret information to be
released to the attacker. Which secret information is allowed
to be released is defined in terms of a set of escape hatches:
expressions that denote values allowed to be released.
Delimited release then strengthens the indistinguishabil-
ity relation on the initial state to require that any two states
related under this relation also agree on the values of the
escape hatch expressions. One way to understand delimited
release as a weakening of noninterference is to observe that,
in changing the relation in this way, it is effectively encoding
the assumption that the attacker might already know the
secret information denoted by the escape hatch expressions.
To keep our formulation brief, we assume that the initial
memory contains no secrets. Thus all secrets are contained
only in the input streams (channels). Then escape hatches
denote values that are allowed to be released as functions
on lists vs of inputs (to be) consumed from a channel.
A delimited release policy E is a function that given
source and destination security levels lvl src and lvldst re-
turns a set of escape hatches denoting the information that
is allowed to be declassified from level lvl src to level lvldst .
For example, to specify that the program is always
allowed to declassify to ⊥ the average of the last five inputs
read from the > channel, one could define E(>,⊥) =
{λvs. if len(vs) ≥ 5 then avg(take(5, rev(vs))) else 0},
where avg(xs) calculates the average of a list of values xs ,
take(n, xs) returns a new list containing the first n values
from the list xs , and rev(xs) is the list reversal function.
To define delimited release, we need to define when
two initial states σ agree under the escape hatches E . Since
escape hatches apply only to the streams contained in the
environment envσ, we define when two such environments
agree under E . As earlier, this agreement is defined relative
to an attacker observing at level lvlA, and requires that
all escape hatches that yield values that the attacker is
allowed to observe always evaluate identically under both
environments.
Definition 3.4.1 (Environment Agreement under E). Two
environments env and env ′ agree under the delimited
release policy E for an attacker at level lvlA, written
env
lvlA,E≈ env ′, iff, for all levels lvl src and all levels lvldst ≤
lvlA, and escape hatches h ∈ E(lvl src , lvldst), h applied to
any finite prefix of env(lvl src) yields the same value as when
applied to an equal length prefix of env ′(lvl src).
We then define when two initial states σ and σ′ agree for
a delimited release policy E . The following definition is a
slight simplification of the one in our Isabelle formalisation
(see Definition A.1 in the appendix), which is more general
because it considers arbitrary pairs of states in which some
trace of events might have already been performed.
Definition 3.4.2 (State Agreement under E). States σ and σ′
agree under the delimited release policy E for an attacker
at level lvlA, written σ
lvlA,E≈ σ′, iff (1) σ lvlA≈ σ′, (2) their
memories agree on all variables, and (3) envσ
lvlA,E≈ envσ′ .
Here, condition (2) encodes the simplifying assumption that
the initial memories contain no secrets.
Delimited release is then defined extensionally in the
style of traditional two-run noninterference property.
Definition 3.4.3 (Delimited Release). The concurrent pro-
gram with initial local thread states ls = (ls0, . . . , lsn−1)
satisfies delimited release against an attacker at level lvlA,
written drseclvlA(ls), iff,
∀sched σ σ′ y. σ lvlA,E≈ σ′ ∧ (ls, σ, sched)→∗ y =⇒
(∃y′. (ls, σ′, sched)→∗ y′ ∧ try lvlA≈ try′)
where for a global configuration y = (lsy, σy, schedy) we
write try to abbreviate trσy , the trace executed so far.
3.4.2. Encoding Delimited Release in D
We now encode delimited release policies E via VERON-
ICA’s declassification predicates D(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, c)
which, recall, judge whether command c declassifying
value v from level lvl src to level lvldst in state σ is permit-
ted. Recall that c is either a declassifying assignment “{Ai}
x :̂= E” (in which case lvldst is the label L(x) assigned
to the labelled variable x) or a declassifying output “{Ai}
lvldst !̂ E”. In either case, lvl src is the security level of the
expression E and v is the result of evaluating E in state σ.
To encode delimited release, we need to have
D(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, c) decide whether there is an escape
hatch h ∈ E(lvl src , lvldst) that permits the declassification.
Consider some h ∈ E(lvl src , lvldst). What does it mean for
h to permit the declassification? Perhaps surprisingly, it is
not enough to check whether h evaluates to the value v
being declassified in σ. Suppose h permits declassifying the
average of the last five inputs from channel > and suppose
in σ that this average is 42. An insecure program might
declassify some other secret whose value just happens to
be 42 in σ, but that declassification would be unlikely to
satisfy delimited release if the two secrets are independent.
Instead, to soundly encode delimited release, one needs
to check whether the expression E being declassified is
equal to the escape hatch in general.
To do this, we have D check that in all states in
which this declassification c might be performed, the escape
hatch h evaluates to the value of E in that state. We can
overapproximate the set of all states in which c might
execute by using its annotation {Ai}: all such states must
satisfy the annotation assuming the program is functionally
correct (which VERONICA will prove). Thus we have D
check that in all such states that satisfy the annotation, the
escape hatch h evaluates to the expression E.
Definition 3.4.4 (Delimited Release Encoding). The en-
coding of policy E we denote DE . DE(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, c)
holds always when c is not a declassification command.
Otherwise, let A be c’s annotation and E be the expression
that c declassifies. Then DE(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, c) holds iff
there exists some h ∈ E(lvl src , lvldst) such that for all
states σ′ that satisfy the annotation A, E evaluates in σ′
to the same value that h evaluates to when applied to the
lvl src inputs consumed so far in σ′.
Recall this encoding is sound only for programs that
do not branch on secrets that the policy E forbids from
releasing. We define this condition semantically as a two-
run property, relegating it to Definition A.2 in the appendix
since its meaning is intuitively clear. We say that a program
satisfying this condition is free of E-secret branching.
The example of Section 3.3 that leaks birthYear via
occlusion is not free of E-secret branching. On the other
hand, the program in Figure 1 is free of E-secret branching
for the following E that defines its delimited release policy,
since the only >-value ever branched on (in Figure 1e,
line 8) is the result of the signature check CK .
Definition 3.4.5 (Delimited Release policy for Figure 1).
Allow to be declassified to ⊥ the results of the signature
check CK always, plus any >-input v when CK (v) = 0.
E(>,⊥) =
{λvs. if len(vs) 6= 0 then CK (last(vs)) else 0} ∪
{λvs. if len(vs) 6= 0 ∧ CK (last(vs)) = 0 then
last(vs) else 0}
Indeed, VERONICA can be used to prove that Figure 1
satisfies this delimited release policy by showing that it
satisfies VERONICA’s system security (Definition 3.2.8),
under the following theorem that formally justifies why
VERONICA can encode delimited release policies.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Delimited Release Embedding). Let lvlA be
an arbitrary security level and ls be the initial local thread
states (i.e. thread ids and the code) of a concurrent program
that (1) satisfies sysseclvlA(ls) with D defined according to
Definition 3.4.4, (2) is free of E-secret branching, and (3)
satisfies all of its functional correctness annotations. Then,
the program is delimited release secure, i.e. drseclvlA(ls).
Thus VERONICA can soundly encode purely extensional se-
curity properties like Definition 3.4.3. The extensional form
of the policy for the Figure 1 example is straightforward
and relegated to the appendix (Definition A.3) .
4. Annotated Programs in VERONICA
VERONICA reasons about the security of concurrent
programs, each of whose threads is programmed in the
language whose grammar is given in Figure 3.
Most of these commands are straightforward and appear
in Figure 1. Loops “{A} while E inv {I} do c” carry
a second invariant annotation (here “{I}”) that specifies
the loop invariant, which is key for proving their functional
correctness [62]. The “stop” command halts the execution
of the thread, and is an internal form used only to define
the semantics of the language. The no-op command “{A}
nop” is syntactic sugar for: “{A} x :=x”, while “{A} if E
c endif” is sugar for “{A} if E c else {A} nop endif”.
The semantics for this sequential language is given
in Figure 8, and is relegated to the appendix since it is
straightforward. This semantics is defined as a small step
c ::= {A} x := E (assignment)
| {A} x :̂= E (declassifying assignment)
| {A} lvl ! E (output to channel lvl )
| {A} lvl !̂ E (declassifying output)
| {A} x← lvl (input from channel lvl )
| {A} if E c else c endif (conditional)
| {A} while E inv {A} do c (loop with invariant)
| {A} acquire(`) (lock acquisition)
| {A} release(`) (lock release)
| c; c (sequencing)
| stop (terminated thread)
Figure 3: Syntax of VERONICA threads.
relation on local configurations (lsi, σ) where lsi = (i, c)
is the local state (thread id i and code c) for a thread
and σ = (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ) is the global state
shared with all other threads. bEcmemσ is atomic evalu-
ation of expression E in memory memσ. Notice that the
semantics doesn’t make use of the annotations {A}: they are
merely decorations used to decouple functional correctness.
5. The VERONICA Logic
The VERONICA logic defines a compositional method to
prove when a concurrent program satisfies system security
(Definition 3.2.8), VERONICA’s security condition. Specifi-
cally, it defines a set of rules for reasoning over the program
text of each thread of the concurrent program. A soundness
theorem (Theorem 5.3.1) guarantees that programs that are
functionally correct and whose threads are proved secure
using the VERONICA logic satisfy system security.
The rules of the VERONICA logic appear in Figure 4.
They define a judgement resembling that for a flow-
insensitive security type system that has the form: lvlA ` c
where lvlA is the attacker level and c is an annotated thread
command (see Figure 3).
5.1. Precise Reasoning with Annotations
The rules for VERONICA explicitly make use of the
annotations {A} on program commands to achieve highly
precise reasoning, while still presenting a simple logic to the
user. This is evident in the simplicity of many of the rules of
Figure 4. To understand how annotations are used to achieve
precise reasoning, consider the rule OUTTY for outputting
on channel lvl . When this output is visible to the attacker
(lvl ≤ lvlA), this rule uses the annotation A to reason about
the sensitivity of the data contained in the expression E
at this point in the program, specifically to check that this
sensitivity is no higher than the attacker level lvlA. This is
captured by the predicate sensitivity(A,E, lvlA).
For a security level lvl , annotation A and expression E,
sensitivity(A,E, lvl) holds when, under A, the sensitivity
of the data contained in E is not greater than lvl . This is not
a policy statement about L(E) but, rather, uses A to over-
approximates E’s sensitivity at this point in the program.
sensitivity(A,E, lvl) ≡ ∀σ σ′. σ  A ∧ σ′  A ∧ σ lvl≈ σ′
=⇒ bEcmemσ = bEcmemσ′
Similarly, the declassification rules DASGTY
and DOUTTY use the annotation A to reason precisely
about whether D holds at this point during the program.
5.2. Secret-Dependent Branching
The rule WHILETY for loops does not allow
the loop guard to depend on a secret. In con-
tast, the rule IFTY for reasoning about conditionals
“{A}if E c1 else c2 endif”does. Its final premise appplies
when the sensitivity of the condition E exceeds that which
can be observed by the attacker lvlA, i.e. when the if-
condition has branched on a secret that should not be
revealed to the attacker. The premise requires proving that
the two branches c1 and c2 are lvlA-bisimilar, i.e. that
the attacker cannot distinguish the execution of c1 from
the execution of c2. The formal definition of bisimilarity
(Definition A.7) appears in the appendix.
VERONICA includes a set of proof rules to determine
whether two commands are lvlA-bisimiar. These rules have
been proved sound but, due to lack of space, we refer
the reader to our Isabelle formalisation for the full details.
Briefly, these rules check that both commands (1) perform
the same number of execution steps, (2) modify no labelled
variables x for which L(x) ≤ lvlA, (3) never input from
or output to channels lvl ≤ lvlA, and (4) perform no
declassifications. Thus the lvlA-attacker cannot tell which
command was executed, including via scheduling effects.
One is of course free to implement other analyses to de-
termine bisimilarity. Hence, VERONICA provides a modular
interface for reasoning about secret-dependent branching.
5.3. Soundness
Recall that the soundness theorem requires the con-
current program (with initial thread states) ls =
(ls0, . . . , lsn−1) to satisfy all of its functional correctness
annotations. When this is the case we write  ls .
Theorem 5.3.1 (Soundness). Let ls = ((0, c0), . . . , (n −
1, cn−1)) be the initial local thread states of a concurrent
program. If  ls holds and lvlA ` ci holds for all 0 ≤ i < n,
then the program satisfies system security, i.e. sysseclvlA(ls).
In practice one applies the VERONICA logic for an
arbitrary attacker security level lvlA, meaning that system
security will hold for attackers at all security levels.
The condition  ls can be discharged using any of
the techniques implemented in VERONICA (see Figure 2.3;
Step Â), or via any sound correctness verification method.
6. Further Examples
6.1. The Example of Figure 1
Recall that the concurrent program of Figure 1 imple-
ments an extensional delimited release style policy E defined
in Definition 3.4.5 (see also Definition A.3 in the appendix)
.
We add a fifth thread, which toggles inmode and
outmode while ensuring they agree, and sets valid to zero.
lvlA ` c1 lvlA ` c2
lvlA ` c1; c2 SEQTY
L(x) is undefined
lvlA ` {A}x := E UASGTY
sensitivity(A,E, lvlE) lvlE ≤ L(x)
lvlA ` {A}x := E LASGTY
lvlA ` {A}acquire(`) ACQTY
∀σ. σ  A =⇒ D(L(E),L(x), σ, bEcmemσ , {A}x :̂= E)
lvlA ` {A}x :̂= E DASGTY
lvlA ` {A}release(`) RELTY
∀σ. σ  A =⇒ D(L(E), lvl , σ, bEcmemσ , {A}lvl !̂ E)
lvlA ` {A}lvl !̂ E
DOUTTY
lvlA ` c1 lvlA ` c2 ¬sensitivity(A,E, lvlA) =⇒ ∀i. (i, c1) lvlA∼ (i, c2)
lvlA ` {A}if E c1 else c2 endif IFTY
lvl ≤ lvlA =⇒ sensitivity(A,E, lvlA)
lvlA ` {A}lvl ! E OUTTY
L(x) is undefined
lvlA ` {A}x← lvl UINTY
lvl ≤ L(x)
lvlA ` {A}x← lvl LINTY
lvlA ` c sensitivity(A,E, lvlA) sensitivity(I, E, lvlA)
lvlA ` {A}while E inv{I}do c WHILETY
Figure 4: Rules of the VERONICA logic.
1 {A20} acquire(`);
2 {A21} valid := 0;
3 {A22} inmode := inmode + 1;
4 {A23} outmode := inmode;
5 {A24} release(`)
Proving that this 5-thread program ls satisfies this policy
is relatively straightforward using VERONICA. We employ
VERONICA’s Owicki-Gries implementation to prove that it
satisfies its annotations:  ls . We then use the delimited
release encoding (Definition 3.4.4) to generate the VERON-
ICA declassification policy D that encodes the delimited
release policy. Next, we use the rules of the VERONICA
logic to compositionally prove that each thread lsi is secure
for an arbitrary security level lvl : lvl ` lsi. From this
proof, since we never use the part of the IFTY rule for
branching on secrets, it follows that the program is free
of E-secret branching (we prove this result in general in
our Isabelle formalisation). Then, by the soundness theorem
(Theorem 5.3.1) the program satisfies VERONICA’s system
security property sysseclvl(ls) for arbitrary lvl . Finally, by
the delimited release embedding theorem (Theorem 3.4.1)
it satisfies its delimited release policy E .
6.2. Confirmed Declassification
Besides delimited release-style policies, VERONICA is
geared to verifying state-dependent declassification policies.
Such policies are common in systems in which interactions
with trusted users authorise declassification decisions. For
example, in a sandboxed desktop operating system like
Qubes OS [63], a user can copy sensitive files from a
protected domain into a less protected one, via an explicit
dialogue that requires the user to confirm the release of
the sensitive information. Indeed, user interactions to make
explicit (e.g. “Application X wants permission to access
your microphone. . . ”) or implicit [64] information access
decisions are common in modern computer systems. Yet
verifying that concurrent programs only allow information
access after successful user confirmation has remained out
of reach for prior logics. We show how VERONICA supports
such by considering a modification to Figure 1.
Specifically, suppose the thread in Figure 1e is replaced
by the one in Figure 5 (left). Instead of using the signature
check function CK to decide whether to declassify the >
input, it now asks the user by first outputting the value to
be declassified on channel > and then receiving from the
user a boolean response on channel ⊥.
Naturally the user is trusted, so it is appropriate for their
response to this question to be received on the ⊥ channel.
Recall that ⊥ here means that the information has minimal
secrecy, not minimal integrity. Also, since the threat model
of Section 3.2 forbids the attacker from supplying channel
inputs, we can safely trust the integrity of the user response.
The declassification policy is then specified (see Fig-
ure 5 right) as a VERONICA runtime state-dependent de-
classification predicate D. This predicate specifies that at all
times, the most recent output sent (to the user to confirm) on
the > channel is allowed to be declassified precisely when
the most recent input consumed from the ⊥ channel is 1.
A complete formal statement of the policy satisfied by
this example is relegated to Definition A.4 in the appendix,
since it is a trivial unfolding of Definition 3.2.8. The re-
sulting property is purely extensional, since D above refers
only to the program’s input/output behaviour.
Proving the modified concurrent program secure pro-
ceeds similarly as for Section 6.1.This example demon-
strates VERONICA’s advantages over contemporary log-
ics like COVERN [10] and SECCSL [28], which can-
1 {A25} acquire(`);
2 {A26} if valid = 1
3 {A27} if outmode = 0
4 {A28} ⊥buf := buf
5 else
6 {A29} >buf := buf ;
7 {A30} > ! buf ;
8 {A31} answer ←⊥;
9 {A32} if answer = 1
10 {A33} ⊥buf :̂=
>buf
11 endif
12 endif
13 endif ;
14 {A34} release(`)
D(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, E) =
(v = lastoutput(>, σ) ∧
lastinput(⊥, σ) = 1)
Figure 5: User-confirmed declassification.
not handle declassification. The example mimics the soft-
ware functionality of the Cross Domain Desktop Com-
positor [65] (CDDC), to which these logics were recently
applied [10], [28], but—crucially—includes the addition of
the CDDC’s confirmed-cut-and-paste declassification func-
tionality, which they cannot verify.
6.3. Running Average
As a final stateful-declassification example, consider
Figure 6. The top-left thread inputs >-sensitive numbers
into the (>-labelled) variable buf and keeps a running sum
of the values seem so far in the (>-labelled) variable sum ,
as well as counting the number of such values consumed in
the (⊥-labelled) variable cnt . The security policy allows the
average of the > inputs consumed to be declassified so long
as the program has consumed more inputs than whatever
threshold is stored in the (⊥-labelled) variable min .
D(lvl src , lvldst , σ, v, E) =
if len(inputs(>, σ)) ≥ memσ(min) then
v = avg(inputs(>, σ) else false
Here the function inputs(lvl , σ) extracts from trσ all inputs
consumed so far on channel lvl .
The threshold min is dynamically updated by the
bottom-left thread; the right thread does the declassification.
Thus this system implements a dynamic declassification
policy whose enforcement requires careful coordination be-
tween the three threads. While its proof is similar to the
previous to examples, the declassification policy of this
example refers to internal program state (the variable min),
so is not extensional, unlike the prior examples. Our Isabelle
formalisation contains a modified version of this example
that satisfies an extensional policy in which the dynamic
threshold is given by the ⊥ inputs received.
7. Related Work
VERONICA targets compositional and precise verifica-
tion of expressive forms of information flow security for
shared-memory concurrent programs, by decoupled func-
tional correctness (DFC). Prior techniques typically trade
1 {A35} acquire(`avg);
2 {A36} buf ←>;
3 {A37} cnt := cnt + 1;
4 {A38} sum := sum + buf ;
5 {A39} release(`avg)
(a) Computing a running sum.
1 {A40} acquire(`min);
2 {A41} min := min + 1;
3 {A42} release(`min)
(b) Increasing the minimum threshold.
1 {A43} acquire(`avg);
2 {A44} acquire(`min);
3 {A45} if cnt > min
4 {A46} if cnt > 0
5 {A47} ⊥!̂(sum/cnt)
6 endif
7 endif ;
8 {A48} release(`min);
9 {A49} release(`avg)
(c) Declassifying the average.
Figure 6: Declassifying the average with dynamic threshold.
precision for expressiveness or vice-versa, or depart from
realistic attacker models altogether [66].
Two recent logics that favour precision over expresive-
ness are COVERN [10] and SECCSL [28]. VERONICA is
more expressive than COVERN [10] and SECCSL [28],
because of VERONICA’s ability to reasoning about declas-
sification, which these prior logics cannot handle.
The VERONICA logic is arguably much simpler than
COVERN, even while being more expressive. Like VERON-
ICA, SECCSL is also relatively simple and clean. However,
it focuses on automated application via symbolic execu-
tion [28]. VERONICA, in contrast, was designed to favour
precise reasoning over automation.
VERONICA borrows its functional correctness annota-
tions from the Owicki-Gries proof technique [49]. In doing
so, it inherits a well known [67] property of that tech-
nique: the need to sometimes introduce ghost variables
when reasoning about certain concurrent programs. Such an
example is depicted in Figure 9 in the appendix, where the
ghost variable GHOST encodes a suitable analogue of the
relational invariants of COVERN and SECCSL via the (non-
relational) VERONICA program annotations.
Karbyshev et al. [29] present a highly precise separation
logic based method for compositionally proving security
of concurrent programs. Unlike VERONICA, their approach
supports a far more flexible scheduler model, including
reasoning about benign races on public variables, dynamic
thread creation and thread→scheduler interactions. Unlike
VERONICA, [29] doesn’t support declassification.
Others have examined information flow verification for
distributed concurrent programs, in which threads do not
share memory. Bauereiß et al. [27] present a method for
verifying the security of such programs, including for some
declassification policies and apply it to verify the key func-
tionality of a distributed social media platform. Li et al. [33]
present a rely-guarantee based method, tailored to systems
in which the presence of messages on a channel can re-
veal sensitive information. In VERONICA, input is always
assumed to be available on all channels.
Decoupled functional correctness was foreshadowed in
the recent work of Li and Zhang [68] (as well as in aspects
of Amtoft et al. [7]). Li and Zhang’s approach supports
relatively precise reasoning about data-dependent sensitiv-
ity of sequential (i.e. non-concurrent) programs that carry
annotations on assignment statements. VERONICA extends
this idea across the entire program and applies it to composi-
tional reasoning about shared-memory concurrent programs.
Relational decomposition [69], [70] and the product
program approaches [71]–[73] encode security reasoning via
functional correctness. Instead VERONICA exploits compo-
sitional functional correctness to aid security reasoning.
8. Conclusion
We presented VERONICA, the first compositional logic
for proving information flow security for shared-memory
concurrent programs that supports precise reasoning about
expressive security policies. It embodies a new approach to
building such logics: decoupled functional correctness.
As we demonstrated, VERONICA supports reason-
ing about myriad security policies, including delimited
release-style declassification, value-dependent sensitivity
and runtime-state dependent declassification, and their co-
operative enforcement via non-trivial thread interactions.
VERONICA sets a new standard for reasoning methods for
concurrent information flow security.
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Appendix
1. Ancillary Definitions
Definition A.1 (State Agreement under E (full definition)).
We say that two states σ and σ′ agree under the delimited
release policy E for an attacker at level lvlA, written σ
lvlA,E≈
σ′, iff (1) σ
lvlA≈ σ, (2) their memories agree on all variables,
(3) the same number of inputs has been consumed so far
in each, and (4) the environment obtained by appending the
inputs consumed so far in σ to envσ agrees under E with
the environment obtained by doing likewise to σ′.
Here, condition (2) is encodes the simplifying assump-
tion that the initial memories contain no secrets. Condi-
tions (3) and (4) are more complicated than might be
expected due to having generalised over all σ: for initial
states σ and σ′ in which no events have been been performed
(i.e. trσ and trσ′ are both empty), condition (3) holds
trivially and condition (4) collapses to envσ
lvlA,E≈ envσ′ :
agreement of the two environments under E . In this way this
more general definition is morally equivalent to the simpler
one (Definition 3.4.2) of Section 3.4.
Definition A.2 (Absence of E-Secret Branching). We say
that a program ls doesn’t branch on secrets that the delim-
ited release policy E forbids from releasing, when observed
by an attacker at level lvlA, when if for all schedules sched
and initial states σ, if the program executes to some config-
uration y, then that execution can be matched from any
other initial state σ′ for which σ
lvlA,E≈ σ′ to reach a
configuration y′ whose thread local states lsy′ is equal
to lsy, the thread local states of y (meaning that the two
runs are still executing the same code in all threads) and,
moreover, the same number of lvlA-visible events have been
performed so far in y and y′ and, for all levels lvl , the
same number of inputs from channel lvl has been consumed
in both y and y′.
Extensional Policies
Definition A.3 (Extensional Delimited Release Policy for
Figure 1 and Section 6.1). For completeness, we specify
the extensional security property that the delimited release
policy for Figure 1 (see Definition 3.4.5) encodes.
∀σ sched y σ′.
(∀n. ∀h∈{λvs. if len(vs) 6= 0 then CK (last(vs)) else 0,
λvs. if len(vs) 6= 0 ∧ CK (last(vs)) = 0
then last(vs) else 0}.
h(take(n, envσ)) = h(take(n, envσ′))) ∧
σ
⊥≈ σ′ ∧ (ls, σ, sched)→∗ y ⇒
∃y′. (ls, σ′, sched)→∗ y′ ∧ try ⊥≈ try′
Definition A.4 (Extensional Confirmed Declassification Pol-
icy for Section 6.2).
∀σ sched σ′ ls ′ sched ′ ls ′′ σ′′ sched ′′ e.
(ls, σ, sched)→∗ (ls ′, σ′, sched ′) ∧
(ls ′, σ′, sched ′)→∗ (ls ′′, σ′′, sched ′′) ∧ trσ′′ = trσ′ .e⇒
v = lastoutput(>, σ′) ∧
lastinput(⊥, σ′) = 1 if e = d〈⊥, v, E〉
uncertainty lvlA(ls, σ, sched , trσ′) ⊆
uncertainty lvlA(ls, σ, sched , trσ′ · e)
otherwise
lvlA-Bisimilarity
lvlA-bisimilarity is defined via the notion of an lvlA-
secure bisimulation. Essentially a lvlA-secure bisimulation
is a relational invariant on the execution of a thread that
ensures that each step of its execution satisfies what we call
lvlA-step security.
Definition A.5 (lvl -Step Security). Let lvl be a security
level. Let σ and σ2 be global states such that a single
execution step has occurred from σ to reach σ2, and let
σ′ and σ′2 be likewise, such that σ
lvl≈ σ′. Then these states
satisfy lvl -step security, written stepseclvl(σ, σ2, σ
′, σ′2), iff:
• If the execution step from σ produced a declassification
event visible at level lvl , then, whenever the same event
is produced by the step from σ′, we require that σ2
lvl≈ σ′2.
• If the execution step from σ produced a declassification
event not visible at level lvl , then we require that σ2
lvl≈ σ′2
unconditionally.
• In either case, the number of lvl -visible events in trσ2 and
trσ′2 must be equal.
• Otherwise, if no declassification event is produced in the
step from σ, we require that σ2
lvl≈ σ′2.
Definition A.6 (lvl -Secure Bisimulation). For a security
level lvl , a binary relation R on thread local states (i, c) is
an lvl -secure bisimulation iff whenever (i, c) R (i′, c′):
• i = i′
• c = stop ⇐⇒ c′ = stop
(lsi, σ) (ls ′i, σ′)
(ls0, . . . , lsi, . . . , lsn−1, σ, i · sched ′)→ (ls0, . . . , ls ′i, . . . , lsn−1, σ′, sched ′)
GSTEP
@y. (lsi, σ) y
(ls0, . . . , lsi, . . . , lsn−1, σ, i · sched ′)→ (ls0, . . . , lsi, . . . , lsn−1, σ, sched ′)
GWAIT
Figure 7: Concurrent execution. Here, · · is the small-step semantics of individual thread programs (see Figure 8).
bEcmemσ = v mem ′ = memσ[x 7→ v]
((i, {A}x := E), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (envσ,mem ′, locksσ, trσ)) ASSIGN
bEcmemσ = v mem ′ = memσ[x 7→ v] tr ′ = trσ · d〈L(x), v, E〉
((i, {A}x :̂= E), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (envσ,mem ′, locksσ, tr ′)) DASSIGN
bEcmemσ = v tr ′ = trσ · out〈lvl , v, E〉
((i, {A}lvl ! E), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, tr ′)) OUTPUT
bEcmemσ = v tr ′ = trσ · d〈lvl , v, E〉
((i, {A}lvl !̂ E), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, tr ′))
DOUTPUT
envσ(lvl) = v · vs env ′ = envσ[lvl 7→ vs] mem ′ = memσ[x 7→ v] tr ′ = trσ · in〈lvl , v〉
((i, {A}lvl ← v), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (env ′,mem ′, locksσ, tr ′)) INPUT
bEcmemσ = true
((i, {A}if E c1 else c2 endif), σ) ((i, c1), σ) IFT
bEcmemσ 6= true
((i, {A}if E c1 else c2 endif), σ) ((i, c2), σ) IFF
((i, c1), σ) ((i, c′1), σ′) c′1 6= stop
((i, c1; c2), σ) ((i, c′1; c2), σ′)
SEQ
((i, c1), σ) ((i, c′1), σ′) c′1 = stop
((i, c1; c2), σ) ((i, c2), σ′)
SEQSTOP
bEcmemσ = true
((i, {A}while E inv{I}do c), σ) ((i, c; {A}while E inv{I}do c), σ) WHILET
bEcmemσ 6= true
((i, {A}while E inv{I}do c), σ) ((i, stop), σ) WHILEF
locksσ(`) is undefined locks
′ = locksσ[` 7→ i]
((i, {A}acquire(`)), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (envσ,memσ, locks ′, trσ))
ACQUIRE
locksσ(`) = i locks
′ = locksσ[` is undefined]
((i, {A}release(`)), (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ)) ((i, stop), (envσ,memσ, locks ′, trσ))
RELEASE
Figure 8: Semantics of threads, where σ = (envσ,memσ, locksσ, trσ).
• An execution step of ((i, c), σ)  ((i, c2), σ2) from a
global state σ that satisfies c’s annotation, can be matched
by a step ((i, c′), σ′)  ((i, c′2), σ′2) from any global
state σ′ that satisfies c′’s annotation whenever σ
lvl≈ σ′.
Moreover, in that case (i, c2) R (i, c′2) is preserved and
lvl -step security is satisfied: stepseclvl(σ, σ2, σ
′, σ′2).
Definition A.7 (lvl -Bisimilarity). We say that two local
thread states (i, c) and (i′, c′) are lvl -bisimilar, written
(i, c)
lvl∼ (i′, c′) whenever there exists a lvl -secure bisim-
ulation R that relates them: (i, c) R (i′, c′).
2. A System Requiring Ghost Variables
1 {A50} acquire(`);
2 {A51} inmode := inmode + 1;
3 {A52} outmode := inmode;
4 {A53} release(`) ;
5 {A54} GHOST := 0
(a) Toggling thread.
1 {A55} > !>buf
(b) Outputting > data.
1 {A56} acquire(`);
2 {A57} if inmode = 0
3 {A58} buf ←⊥
4 else
5 {A59} buf ←>
6 endif;
7 {A60} GHOST := 1;
8 {A61} release(`)
(c) Reading data into a shared buffer.
1 {A62} ⊥ !⊥buf
(d) Outputting ⊥ data.
1 {A63} acquire(`);
2 {A64} if outmode = 0
3 {A65} ⊥buf := buf
4 else
5 {A66} >buf := buf
6 endif ;
7 {A67} release(`)
(e) Copying data from a shared buffer.
Figure 9: Co-operative Use of a Shared Buffer without declassification. The variable GHOST is a ghost variable needed
to verify this system in VERONICA. Specifically, it distinguishes the cases in which buf is newly cleared by the toggle
thread (Figure 9a) and those in which the reading thread (Figure 9c) has overwritten buf : these two cases do not need to
be distinguished when using a relational invariant [10], [28] to describe buf ’s (value-dependent) sensitivity in COVERN, but
this distinction is required when encoding this same information via the VERONICA annotations.
